Who has the right to apply for Latvian citizenship?
Before we figure out how Russians can obtain Latvian citizenship, let’s find out who can apply for it. Conditions for issuing a passport:
- availability of a country resident card (residence permit, permanent residence permit);
- permanent residence for at least 5 years;
- recognition of the Constitution of the Republic;
- no threat to state security from the applicant;
- willingness to fully integrate into local society.
The following will not be able to obtain a Latvian passport:
- employees of special services, state apparatus, military personnel;
- persons with actively promoted extremist views (for example, members of terrorist groups, left-wing and right-wing political groups that are considered hostile in Latvia);
- applicants who refuse to recognize the Constitution of the Republic of Latvia;
- convicted under the Criminal Code of Latvia.
You will also need to learn the language and pass an exam. Graduates of Latvian universities, disabled people (any group), and pensioners over 65 years of age are exempt from verification.
Methods of obtaining
At the moment, to obtain Latvian citizenship you need:
- Go through naturalization.
- Assign status.
- Be born on the territory of the state.
- Perform special merits.
There are simplified schemes, but they are not available to everyone. Each method has its own characteristics, conditions and limitations.
Good to know! Russians who are not ethnic Latvians, born outside the republic, receive a passport only after naturalization or for special merits.
The scheme for obtaining citizenship is always the same - first a visa, then a residence permit, permanent residence and a passport. If you already have a temporary type, make it permanent after 5 years (you will need to submit a permit). During the first five years of residence in the country, travel can be done, but for no more than a year in total. The permissible duration of one long trip is 6 months.
The most common method of obtaining Lithuanian citizenship is through naturalization. To begin the procedure, a desire from the applicant is sufficient. However, there is no guarantee in advance that you will be naturalized.
Do you want to get EU citizenship in 12 months? Take the free test and find out your chances.
Conditions for naturalization
Let's look at how a citizen with Russian citizenship can obtain a Latvian passport. The first and main condition is that you will need to live in the country permanently for a long time (at least 5 years). Other requirements:
- age over 15 years;
- knowledge of the national language at a high level;
- mastery of the country's history;
- agreement with the provisions of the Constitution;
- knowledge of the anthem.
Important! Anyone can get a residence permit, but to gain Latvian citizenship, you will need to renounce your old citizenship. The law allows dual citizenship only in exceptional situations.
Also prepare a document confirming your high level of wealth. Possible options are a bank account, papers confirming the rental of housing, a certificate from an official place of work. Issues regarding obtaining citizenship are dealt with in Latvia by the Office of Migration Policy.
Nuances of knowledge testing
To be granted Latvian resident status, citizens of other countries will need to go through several stages of knowledge testing. This:
- language;
- hymn;
- story;
- constitution.
For these purposes, a multi-stage test is carried out. The first exam is a language exam, testing written and oral speech. The rest of the tests can be taken in any format of the test taker’s choice. An oath of allegiance to the country is required, and a state fee is paid.
Exceptions for knowledge testing
The government of the republic has developed a list of exceptions to speed up the process of obtaining citizenship. Graduates of local universities do not need to take a language proficiency test if they have completed full training and the result of the language exam is at least D level.
Good to know ! Retaking tests, if required, is allowed only three times. When the limit is reached, the application is rejected.
Latvian citizenship for Russians
Naturalization On this basis, Russians who have reached the age of 15 can obtain citizenship status. Children under this age receive status together with their parents. To be naturalized, you must meet the following conditions:
- Residence in Latvia for five years, the break should not exceed one year (for foreign citizens, five years of residence is required based on permanent residence status).
- Knowledge of the Latvian language, constitutional principles, historical and cultural features of the country.
- Availability of a legal source of profit.
Marriage
Unlike most European countries, entering into an official marriage with a Latvian citizen does not give citizenship status. To obtain this status, spouses must have lived in the country for at least 10 years (the first half of the period on the basis of a residence permit and the second on the basis of permanent residence), and have a good command of the Latvian language.
Birth
A child whose one parent has resident status in Latvia in 2021 can obtain citizenship. A child can be born not only in Latvia, but also abroad. Documents for obtaining citizenship are submitted to the Latvian Office dealing with these issues, or a diplomatic mission in another country.
Origin
You can obtain citizenship on this basis in the following cases:
- One parent, grandparent, great-grandparent or great-grandparent was a Latvian citizen before 1940.
- These relatives were deported from the country between 1940 and 1990.
Lawyers for the “Investor Visa” website recommend paying attention to the fact that when submitting an application, you should submit documents confirming family ties, as well as evidence of expulsion of relatives. You can request official papers in the archives.
Adoption
If Latvian residents adopt a minor, he immediately receives citizenship of the country. No special conditions are required for the procedure. It is assumed that the child will learn the language while living with a family and studying at school in Latvia.
Merit to the country
You can obtain the status by decision of the president.
Refugees
Refugees can receive asylum in the country for political reasons and count on citizenship after five years in Latvia.
List of documents
To consider an application for citizenship, you must submit the following official documents to the Latvian diplomatic mission:
1. Completed application. Provide basic information about the applicant (full name, year of birth, status), grounds for obtaining citizenship, signature and date.
2. National passport.
3. Four color photos.
4. Confirmation of permanent residence status in Latvia.
5. Proof of a legal source of income that meets or exceeds the minimum wage (document from the place of employment, bank statement, pensioner ID, letter from the sponsor).
6. A document from a Latvian medical organization about the proper state of health. Diseases that are transmitted to other people and mental pathologies are taken into account.
7. Confirmation of no criminal record received from the Latvian Ministry of Internal Affairs.
8. Certificate of absence of tax arrears.
9. Receipt confirming payment of the fee.
10. Certificates confirming the birth of children if you are traveling with them.
Additional documentation includes military ID cards and marriage certificates. All official papers will be translated into Latvian in 2021.
Submission of documents
Documents are submitted by Russians to the Department of Migration Policy of Latvia.
Citizenship for minors
Student immigration is a good option for young people who want to study and then live permanently in the country. But years of study during permanent residence are not taken into account.
Another principle for assigning citizenship to minors is by birth. Programs:
- Children without parents, subject to birth (of the child) on the territory of the Republic. Citizenship is issued automatically.
- Children 15-18 years old who live in the country with their parents. The test results and a certificate of good conduct are attached to the application.
Procedure for obtaining citizenship
Obtaining a residence permit is the first thing a non-resident will need to do. For this:
- Buy residential premises in the amount of 250 thousand euros, so that 80 thousand goes to the cost of the cadastre.
- Through investments - their migrants invest in local operating enterprises. Before investing, a fee of up to 100 thousand euros is paid.
- Purchase of government interest-free bonds – from 250 thousand euros. To obtain a residence permit, it will be possible to repay the fee only after 5 years.
Required documents
The package of papers for registration of citizenship includes:
- Application - there is no strict form, so any form is allowed. Provide all personal information.
- Passport of a citizen of the Russian Federation.
- Four color passport photos, neutral background.
- Documents confirming the availability of a place to live in the country.
- Proof of a stable legal source of income.
- Certificate of health (issued strictly in Latvia).
- Documentary evidence of the absence of criminal records and arrests (place of issue – Latvian Ministry of Internal Affairs).
- Certificate of absence of tax debts.
- Duty.
Birth certificates are provided for children upon family immigration. You may be required to provide other documents. The papers are translated into Latvian and certified.
Terms of consideration
Submit the package of papers to any branch of the migration department. They are in every police station. Applications are considered for up to a year.
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Price
Officially, the applicant only has to pay a fee of 29 euros. When contacting intermediary organizations, costs will increase (prices for services vary). Law firms significantly speed up the process of obtaining citizenship, prepare documents, and communicate with representatives of authorities.
Specifics of obtaining a residence permit
The process of obtaining citizenship begins with a visa and then a residence permit. A permanent residence permit can be obtained after 5 years of residence in the country, and after 10 years one can apply for citizenship. Before obtaining a permanent residence permit, a temporary ID must be registered annually. Russians can move to Latvia only with a visa, which is issued at consulates abroad.
A Schengen visa to Latvia allows you to stay in the country for no more than 3 months in one half-year. To live permanently in the republic, a foreigner must obtain a residence permit. Entry into the state for further registration of a residence permit is possible only with a long-term national visa. There must be serious grounds for its issuance.
From 2021, in Latvia, as part of the Golden Visa program, a fee for renewing a residence permit for the next five years has been introduced in the amount of 5,000 euros.
For family reunification and marriage
One of the easiest ways to obtain a residence permit in Latvia is an official marriage with a Latvian. As in any European country, the authorities check the relationship for fictitiousness. Spouses, children, elderly parents of residents and citizens of the country, as well as other relatives up to the 3rd degree of kinship have the right to move.
Study in Latvia
Students undergoing long-term studies at local universities receive a residence permit. During their studies, they can work up to 20 hours a week, and during the holidays - up to 40. However, immigration to Latvia in this way is not very popular. A mandatory requirement for applicants is knowledge of the Latvian language, and this language is not the easiest to learn.
Other options to legally live and work in Latvia
Another option for obtaining a residence permit is investing. A foreigner must invest at least €300 thousand in the development of the country’s economy for a period of more than 5 years. In addition, permanent residence is available for entrepreneurs who are ready to open a business in Latvia. The size of the company’s authorized capital is more than €35 thousand.
There are other options for immigration to Latvia:
- Employment (including through the EU Blue Card).
- Scientific and business projects;
- Obtaining refugee status.
Recently, the Latvian authorities and banks have begun to more carefully study the legality of the origin of capital from Russia. Investing or buying real estate in Latvia has become more difficult than it was a few years ago. Nevertheless, this Baltic republic, along with Cyprus, Malta, and Bulgaria, remains a desirable place where Russians can obtain residence permits and citizenship on acceptable terms.
Video: difficulties in obtaining a Latvian residence permit
Is it possible to have dual citizenship?
Latvia allows dual citizenship in a limited list of cases. In order not to renounce old citizenship, an appropriate agreement between countries is required - Russia and Ukraine do not have one.
Permission to maintain the previous status of a citizen is given by the Cabinet of Ministers. After an official marriage is concluded and the adoption process is completed, this is possible, but the issue is considered individually - please check. Exceptions also apply to minor children - the child chooses the citizenship of one of the parents. The mother or father must be a citizen of Latvia.
Do I need to give up my Russian passport?
Only citizens of countries with which the Republic has signed an agreement have the right to dual citizenship in Latvia. Unfortunately, immigrants from the Russian Federation do not fall into this category.
However, there are exceptions that allow you to obtain Latvian citizenship without renouncing Russian citizenship:
- conclusion of an official marriage;
- adoption by Latvian citizens;
- the parents of the minor have different citizenships – Russian and Latvian.
Reference . Permission for second citizenship is provided by the Cabinet of Ministers.
Common reasons for failure
Refusal to obtain citizenship is not uncommon. Applications are rejected from applicants who have previously been found to have committed illegal, unconstitutional actions that threaten the independence status of the Republic of Latvia. If a person propagated the ideas of a fascist or communist regime on the territory of the country, there are supporting facts, and a refusal will also be given.
Other possible reasons:
- involvement in government institutions of other countries;
- military duty in the state of nationality;
- criminal record, current criminal record.
Possible reasons for refusal and further actions
Latvian authorities quite rarely deny citizenship to persons who meet the requirements stipulated by law. However, there are also cases of refusal.
Possible reasons for refusal could be:
- proven fraudulent actions taken in obtaining Latvian citizenship, for example, a fictitious marriage or forged documents;
- lack of legal income or its level is too low;
- insufficient period of residence in the country;
- presence of problems with the laws of Latvia;
- criminal record or criminal prosecution for actions committed on the territory of the Russian Federation, if such articles are in the Criminal Code of Latvia;
- lack of necessary documents;
- committing a criminal act outside the territory of the Republic.
You can appeal the refusal in court after receiving a letter from the Cabinet of Ministers with the reason why citizenship cannot be issued.
Important ! When filing an appeal, you must indicate what exactly was violated.
Sometimes the reason for refusal may be an incorrect translation or interpretation of the facts of the candidate’s biography. This information must also be indicated in the appeal. You are more likely to get a positive decision by contacting a lawyer.
Benefits of becoming a Latvian citizen
Russians immigrating to Latvia receive a number of advantages after obtaining a new citizenship:
- the possibility of visa-free entry into the territory of any European state;
- a chance to obtain citizenship of another European Union country in the future according to a simplified scheme;
- the possibility of enrolling in a European university without a student visa;
- the right to take part in the political life of the country (vote, stand for parliament);
- the opportunity to conduct business with support from the state, subsidies, benefits;
- opening reliable bank accounts in the country's leading financial institutions, obtaining mortgages and other loans on loyal terms;
- obtaining priority rights to prestigious positions during employment (in comparison with foreigners);
- Possibility of visa-free entry into the United States.
The list is impressive, and it will be of interest to many Russians and people from other CIS countries. If you meet the country's applicant requirements, try applying for status. The process, as in other EU countries, takes about 10 years (if not carried out according to a simplified scheme).
Latvian citizenship gives Russians important advantages. They can work, study here, obtain citizenship of other EU countries, and travel around the world without a visa, including the USA and Canada. The requirements are similar to those of most other European countries, with special attention paid to knowledge of language, culture, and constitution. Strictly no criminal record, no criminal liability. The scheme for assigning citizenship is registration of a residence permit, then permanent residence and an application for citizenship. The fee costs 29 euros, but when contacting intermediary companies you will have to pay for their services. Applications are reviewed within six months to a year. Refusal based on the test results is likely.
To maintain constant reactor power (i.e., zero reactivity) with a small operational reactivity margin, it is necessary to almost completely remove the control rods from the core. This configuration (with the rods removed) on RBMK reactors was dangerous for several reasons:
- it was difficult to ensure uniformity of energy release throughout the core;
- the vapor coefficient of reactivity increased;
- conditions were created for an increase in power in the first seconds after the emergency protection was triggered due to the “end effect” of the rods;
The station staff apparently only knew about the first of these; Neither the dangerous increase in steam coefficient nor the end effect was mentioned in the documents in force at that time.
It should be noted that there is no direct connection between the manifestation of the end effect and the operational reactivity margin. The risk of this effect occurs when a large number of control rods are in their highest positions. This is only possible when the ORM is small, however, with the same ORM, the rods can be positioned differently - so that a different number of rods will be in a dangerous position. There were no restrictions in the regulations on the maximum number of fully removed rods.
Thus, the personnel were not aware of the true dangers associated with working at low reactivity margins. In addition, the project did not provide adequate means for measuring ORM. Despite the enormous importance of this parameter, there was no indicator on the remote control that would continuously show it. Usually the operator received the latest value in a printout, which was delivered to him twice an hour; It was also possible to instruct the computer to calculate the current value; this calculation lasted several minutes.
Before the accident, a large number of control rods were in the upper positions, and the ORM was less than the value allowed by regulations. The operators did not know the current ORM value and, accordingly, did not know that they were violating the regulations. However, IAEA experts believe that the operators acted carelessly and placed the rods in a position that would have been dangerous even if there had been no end effect.
Alternative versions
At different times, different versions have been put forward to explain the causes of the Chernobyl accident. Experts offered different hypotheses about what led to the power surge. Among the reasons were: the so-called “failure” of circulation pumps (disruption of their operation as a result of cavitation), caused by exceeding the permissible water flow rate, rupture of large cross-section pipelines and others. Various scenarios were also considered regarding how exactly the processes that led to the destruction of the reactor after a power surge developed, and what happened to the fuel after that. Some of the versions were refuted by research conducted in subsequent years, others remain relevant to this day. Although there is consensus among experts on the main causes of the accident, some details still remain unclear.
Versions are also put forward that are radically different from the official one and are not supported by specialists.
For example, immediately after the accident it was suggested that the explosion was the result of sabotage, for some reason hidden by the authorities. Like any other “conspiracy theory,” this version is difficult to refute, since any facts that do not fit into it are declared falsified.
Another version, which has become widely known, explains the accident as a local earthquake. As justification, they cite a seismic shock recorded around the time of the accident. Proponents of this version argue that the shock was recorded before, and not at the moment of the explosion (this statement is disputed), and the strong vibration that preceded the disaster could have been caused not by processes inside the reactor, but by an earthquake. They believe that the reason that the neighboring third unit was not damaged is the fact that the tests were carried out only at the 4th power unit. NPP employees stationed at other units did not feel any vibrations.
According to the version proposed by K.P. Checherov, the explosion was of a nuclear nature. Moreover, the main energy of the explosion was released not in the reactor shaft, but in the space of the reactor hall, where the core, along with the reactor cover and the loading and unloading machine, was raised, according to his assumption, by the reactive force created by steam escaping from the torn channels. This was followed by the fall of the reactor cover into the shaft. The resulting blow was interpreted by eyewitnesses as a second explosion. This version was proposed in order to explain the supposed lack of fuel inside the “sarcophagus”. According to Checherov, no more than 10% of the nuclear fuel in the reactor was found in the reactor shaft, sub-reactor and other rooms. No nuclear fuel was also found on the territory of the station, but many fragments of zirconium tubes several centimeters long with characteristic damage were found - as if they had been torn from the inside. According to other sources, about 95% of the fuel is inside the sarcophagus.
A special place among such versions is occupied by the version presented by B. I. Gorbachev, an employee of the Interdisciplinary Scientific and Technical National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine. According to this version, the explosion occurred due to the fact that the operators, when raising power after its failure, removed too many control rods and blocked the emergency protection, which prevented them from quickly raising power. At the same time, they allegedly did not notice that the power began to increase, which ultimately led to the acceleration of the prompt reactor.
According to B.I. Gorbachev, a forgery was committed in relation to the primary source data used for analysis by all technical experts (at the same time, he himself selectively uses this data). And he believes that, in fact, the chronology and sequence of events of the accident were different. So, for example, according to its chronology, the reactor explosion occurred 25-30 seconds before pressing the emergency protection button (AZ-5), and not 6-10 seconds after, as everyone else believes. B.I. Gorbachev combines pressing the AZ-5 button exactly with the second explosion, which for this purpose is transferred by him 10 seconds ago. According to him, this second explosion was a hydrogen explosion and was recorded by seismic stations as a weak earthquake.
B.I. Gorbachev’s version contains internal inconsistencies that are obvious to specialists, is not consistent with the physics of the processes occurring in a nuclear reactor and contradicts registered facts. This has been repeatedly pointed out, however, the version has become widespread on the Internet.
Consequences of the accident
Immediate consequences
One person died directly during the explosion at the fourth power unit. 134 Chernobyl NPP employees and members of rescue teams who were at the station during the explosion developed radiation sickness, 28 of them died. Soon after the accident at the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant, fire brigade units to protect the nuclear power plant arrived and began extinguishing the fire, mainly on the roof of the turbine hall. Of the two available devices for 1000 roentgens per hour, one failed, and the other was inaccessible due to the debris that had arisen. Therefore, in the first hours of the accident, no one knew for sure the real levels of radiation in the premises of the block and around it. The state of the reactor was also unclear.
In the first hours after the accident, many apparently did not realize how badly damaged the reactor was, so the mistaken decision was made to supply water to the reactor core to cool it. These efforts were futile, since both the pipelines and the core itself were destroyed, but they required work in areas with high radiation. Other actions of the station personnel, such as extinguishing local fires in the station premises, measures aimed at preventing a possible hydrogen explosion, etc., on the contrary, were necessary. They may have prevented even more serious consequences. While performing this work, many station employees received large doses of radiation, some even fatal. Among them were the unit shift supervisor A. Akimov and operator L. Toptunov, who controlled the reactor during the accident.
Evacuation of the population
Initially, the population was not informed about the accident. In the first hours this was probably due to a lack of understanding of the scale of the danger. However, very soon it became clear that the evacuation of Pripyat would be required, which was carried out on April 27. In the first days after the accident, the population of the 10-kilometer zone was evacuated. In the following days, the population of other settlements within the 30-kilometer zone was evacuated. Despite this, neither on April 26 nor 27 were residents warned of the existing danger or given any recommendations on how to behave in order to reduce the impact of radioactive contamination. The first official announcement was made on television only on April 28. By this time, an increase in background radiation had already been registered in Sweden and, based on the isotopic composition of the radioactive cloud, experts determined that an accident had occurred at a nuclear power plant. This first message contained very little information about what had happened, and the population was still not warned of the danger.
Elimination of consequences of the accident
To eliminate the consequences of the accident, a government commission was created, the chairman of which was appointed Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR B. E. Shcherbina. To coordinate the work, republican commissions were also created in the Byelorussian, Ukrainian SSR and in the RSFSR, various departmental commissions and headquarters. Specialists sent to carry out work on and around the emergency unit, as well as military units, both regular and made up of urgently called up reservists, began to arrive in the 30-kilometer zone around the Chernobyl nuclear power plant. They all later began to be called “liquidators.” The liquidators worked in the dangerous zone in shifts: those who received the maximum permissible dose of radiation left, and others came to take their place. The bulk of the work was carried out in 1986-1987, involving approximately 240,000 people. The total number of liquidators (including subsequent years) was approximately 600,000.
In the early days, the main efforts were aimed at reducing radioactive emissions from the destroyed reactor and preventing even more serious consequences. For example, there were concerns that decay heat in the fuel remaining in the reactor would cause a core meltdown. The molten material could enter the flooded room below the reactor and cause another explosion with a large release of radioactivity.
Then work began to clean up the area and bury the destroyed reactor. A concrete “sarcophagus” (the so-called “Shelter” object) was built around the 4th block. Since the decision was made to launch the 1st, 2nd and 3rd blocks of the station, the radioactive debris scattered throughout the territory of the nuclear power plant and on the roof of the turbine hall was removed inside the sarcophagus or concreted. Decontamination was carried out in the premises of the first three power units. Construction of the sarcophagus was completed in November 1986.
According to RSMDR data, over the past years, among Russian liquidators with radiation doses above 100 mSv (about 60 thousand people), several dozen deaths could be associated with radiation. In just 20 years, approximately 5 thousand liquidators in this group died from all causes not related to radiation.
Legal consequences
After the accident at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant, the legislation of the USSR and then Russia established the responsibility of persons who deliberately conceal or do not communicate to the population the consequences of environmental disasters and man-made accidents. Information related to the environmental safety of places cannot now be classified as secret. According to Article 10 of the Federal Law of February 20, 1995 N 24-FZ “On information, informatization and information protection”
information about emergency situations, environmental, meteorological, demographic, sanitary-epidemiological and other information necessary to ensure the safe operation of production facilities, the safety of citizens and the population as a whole, are open and cannot be classified as information with limited access.
In accordance with Article 7 of the Law of the Russian Federation of July 21, 1993 N 5485-1 “On State Secrets”,
information about the state of the environment is not subject to classification as a state secret and classified. The current Criminal Code of the Russian Federation in Article 237 provides for the liability of persons for concealing information about circumstances that create a danger to the life or health of people:
Long-term consequences
As a result of the accident, about 5 million hectares of land were taken out of agricultural use, and a 30-kilometer exclusion zone
, hundreds of small settlements were destroyed and buried (buried with heavy equipment). Before the accident, the fourth unit reactor contained 180–190 tons of nuclear fuel (uranium dioxide). Estimates currently considered best estimate that between 5 and 30% of this amount was released into the environment. Some researchers dispute these data, citing existing photographs and eyewitness observations that show the reactor is virtually empty. It should, however, be taken into account that the volume of 180 tons of uranium dioxide is only a small part of the reactor volume. The reactor was mostly filled with graphite, which burned in the first days after the accident. In addition, some of the fuel is now outside the reactor vessel.
In addition to fuel, the core at the time of the accident contained fission products and transuranium elements - various radioactive isotopes that accumulated during operation of the reactor. They pose the greatest radiation hazard. Most of them remained inside the reactor, but the most volatile substances were released outside, including:
- all noble gases contained in the reactor;
- approximately 55% iodine in the form of a mixture of steam and solid particles, as well as in organic compounds;
- cesium and tellurium in the form of aerosols.
The total activity of substances released into the environment was, according to various estimates, up to 14 × 1018 Bq (14 EBq), including:
More than 200,000 km² were polluted, approximately 70% in Belarus, Russia and Ukraine. Radioactive substances spread in the form of aerosols, which gradually settled on the surface of the earth. The noble gases dissipated in the atmosphere and did not contribute to the pollution of the regions adjacent to the station. Pollution was very uneven and depended on wind direction in the first days after the accident. Areas that received rain at the time were hit the hardest. Most of the strontium and plutonium fell within 100 km of the plant, as they were contained mainly in larger particles. Iodine and cesium spread over a wider area.
From the point of view of the impact on the population in the first weeks after the accident, the greatest danger was posed by radioactive iodine, which has a relatively short half-life (eight days) and tellurium. Currently (and in the coming decades), the greatest danger is posed by isotopes of strontium and cesium with a half-life of about 30 years. The highest concentrations of cesium-137 are found in the surface layer of soil, from where it enters plants and fungi. Insects and the animals that feed on them are also exposed to pollution. Radioactive isotopes of plutonium and americium will persist in the soil for hundreds, and possibly thousands of years, but their quantities do not pose a threat.
In cities, the bulk of hazardous substances accumulated on flat surface areas: on lawns, roads, roofs. Due to the influence of wind and rain, as well as as a result of human activity, the degree of pollution has greatly decreased and radiation levels in most places have now returned to background values. In agricultural areas, in the first months, radioactive substances were deposited on plant leaves and grass, so herbivores were exposed to contamination. Then the radionuclides, along with rain or fallen leaves, entered the soil, and now they enter agricultural plants, mainly through the root system. Contamination levels in agricultural areas have decreased significantly, but in some regions the amount of cesium in milk may still exceed acceptable levels. This applies, for example, to the Gomel and Mogilev regions in Belarus, the Bryansk region in Russia, and the Zhitomir and Rivne regions in Ukraine.
Forests have been significantly polluted. Because cesium is constantly recycled into the forest ecosystem rather than removed from it, contamination levels in forest products such as mushrooms, berries and game remain hazardous. Pollution levels in rivers and most lakes are currently low. However, in some “closed” lakes, from which there is no drainage, the concentration of cesium in water and fish may pose a danger for decades to come.
Pollution was not limited to the 30-kilometer zone. Increased levels of cesium-137 were noted in lichen and deer meat in the Arctic regions of Russia, Norway, Finland and Sweden. In 1988, a radiation-ecological reserve was created on the contaminated territory. Observations have shown that the number of mutations in plants and animals, although it has increased, is insignificant, and nature is successfully coping with their consequences. On the other hand, the removal of anthropogenic impact had a positive effect on the ecosystem of the reserve and the influence of this factor significantly exceeded the negative effects of radiation. As a result, nature began to recover at a rapid pace, animal populations grew, and the diversity of vegetation species increased.
Impact of the accident on human health
Estimates of the impact of the Chernobyl accident on human health are very contradictory. Greenpeace and the international organization Doctors Against Nuclear War claim that as a result of the accident, tens of thousands of people died among the liquidators alone, in Europe there were 10,000 cases of deformities in newborns, 10,000 cases of thyroid cancer and another 50,000 are expected. According to the organization Union “Chernobyl”, out of 600,000 liquidators, 10% died and 165,000 became disabled.
On the other hand, the Chernobyl Forum - an organization operating under the auspices of the UN, including its organizations such as the IAEA and WHO - published an extensive report in 2005, which analyzed numerous scientific studies of the influence of factors associated with the accident on the health of liquidators and population. The conclusions contained in this report, as well as in a less detailed review “The Chernobyl Legacy” published by the same organization, differ significantly from the above assessments. The number of possible victims by now and in the coming decades is estimated at several thousand people. It is emphasized that this is only an order of magnitude estimate, since due to the very small doses of radiation received by the majority of the population, the effect of radiation exposure is very difficult to isolate against the background of random fluctuations in morbidity and mortality and other factors not directly related to radiation. The latter factors include, for example, the decline in living standards after the collapse of the USSR, which led to an overall increase in mortality and a decrease in life expectancy in the three countries most affected by the accident, as well as a change in the age composition of the population in some heavily polluted areas (part of the younger population left). It is also noted that a slightly increased morbidity rate among people who did not directly participate in the liquidation of the accident, but were resettled from the exclusion zone to other places, is not directly related to exposure (in these categories there is a slightly increased morbidity rate of the cardiovascular system, metabolic disorders, nervous diseases and other diseases not caused by radiation), but caused by stress associated with the very fact of relocation, loss of property, social problems, fear of radiation.
Given the large number of people living in areas affected by radioactive contamination, even small differences in estimates of disease risk can lead to large differences in estimates of the expected number of cases. Greenpeace and a number of other public organizations insist on the need to take into account the impact of the accident on public health in other countries. Even lower radiation doses make it difficult to obtain statistically reliable results and make such estimates inaccurate. On April 26, 2006, on the 20th anniversary of the explosion at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant, the Russian newspapers Vedomosti and Kommersant published an article by Kalman Mizsei, Assistant Secretary General of the UN, Assistant Administrator of the UN Development Program, Director of the UNDP Regional Bureau for Europe and the CIS, and Senior Manager UNDP programs for the CIS and the Caucasus, expert of the coordination center for Chernobyl Louise Vinton “Chernobyl: Myths and Misconceptions.” The authors argue, citing scientific research, that the effects of radiation from the Chernobyl accident were weaker than previously thought. The article provides the following information about the victims:
- several dozen rescue workers who participated in extinguishing the fire at the nuclear power plant died from acute radiation sickness;
- an increased incidence of cancer, cardiovascular diseases and cataracts among accident liquidators was noted;
- About 5,000 cases of thyroid cancer have been identified in those who survived the accident as children as a result of radioactive iodine entering the body along with milk;
- At the same time, the radiation did not have any detectable effect on the physical health of the 5 million residents of the affected areas - according to the authors, "this is due to the fact that these people were exposed to small doses of radiation, in most cases comparable to natural background radiation." At the same time, the article states, “scientists have been unable to establish a connection between radiation and medical manifestations, with the exception of thyroid cancer, which is successfully treated in 98.5% of cases.”
Radiation doses
Average doses received by different categories of the population
Category | Period | Number (persons) | Dose (mSv) |
Liquidators | 1986-1989 | 600 000 | ~100 |
Evacuees | 1986 | 116 000 | 33 |
Residents of "strict control" zones | 1986-2005 | 270 000 | >50 |
Residents of other contaminated areas | 1986-2005 | 5 000 000 | 10—20 |
The highest doses were received by approximately 1,000 people who were near the reactor at the time of the explosion and who took part in emergency work in the first days after it. These doses ranged from 2 to 20 Gy and were fatal in some cases.
Most of the liquidators who worked in the danger zone in subsequent years and local residents received relatively small doses of radiation to the entire body. For liquidators, they averaged 100 mSv, although sometimes exceeded 500. Doses received by residents evacuated from heavily contaminated areas sometimes reached several hundred millisieverts, with an average value estimated at 33 mSv. The doses accumulated in the years after the accident are estimated at 10–50 mSv for most residents of the contaminated area, and up to several hundred for some of them. For comparison, residents of some regions of the Earth with a high natural background (for example, in Brazil, India, Iran and China) receive radiation doses equal to approximately 100-200 mSv over 20 years.
In the first weeks after the accident, many local residents ate food (mainly milk) contaminated with radioactive iodine-131. Iodine accumulated in the thyroid gland, and this led to large doses of radiation to this organ, in addition to the dose to the whole body received due to external radiation and radiation from other radionuclides that entered the body. For residents of Pripyat, these doses were significantly reduced (estimated by 6 times) due to the use of iodine-containing drugs; in other areas such prophylaxis was not carried out. The doses received varied from 0.03 to several grays, and in some cases reached 50 Gy. Currently, most residents of the contaminated zone receive less than 1 mSv per year above the natural background.
Acute radiation sickness
134 cases of acute radiation sickness were recorded among people performing emergency work at the fourth unit. In many cases, radiation sickness was complicated by radiation skin burns caused by β-radiation. During 1986, 28 people died from radiation sickness. Two more people died during the accident from causes unrelated to radiation, and one died, presumably from coronary thrombosis. During 1987–2004, another 19 people died, but their deaths were not necessarily caused by radiation sickness.
Oncological diseases
The thyroid gland is one of the organs most at risk of cancer from radioactive contamination because it accumulates iodine-131; The risk is especially high for children. Between 1990 and 1998, more than 4,000 cases of thyroid cancer were reported among those who were under 18 years of age at the time of the accident. Given the low likelihood of the disease at this age, some of these cases are considered a direct consequence of radiation exposure. Experts from the UN Chernobyl Forum believe that with timely diagnosis and proper treatment, this disease does not pose a very serious threat to life, but at least 15 people have already died from it. Experts believe that the incidence of thyroid cancer will continue to rise for many years to come.
Some studies show an increase in the incidence of leukemia and other types of cancer (except leukemia and thyroid cancer) in both cleanup workers and residents of contaminated areas. These results are contradictory and often statistically unreliable, and no convincing evidence of an increase in the risk of these diseases directly associated with the accident has been found. However, observation of a large group of liquidators conducted in Russia revealed an increase in mortality by several percent. If this result is correct, it means that among the 600,000 people exposed to the highest doses of radiation, cancer deaths would increase by about four thousand as a result of the accident, over and above the approximately 100,000 deaths due to other causes.
From experience gained earlier, for example, from observations of victims of the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, it is known that the risk of leukemia decreases several decades after irradiation. In the case of other types of cancer, the situation is reversed. During the first 10-15 years, the risk of getting sick is low, and then increases. However, it is not clear how applicable this experience is, since most victims of the Chernobyl accident received significantly lower doses.
Hereditary diseases
Various public organizations report very high rates of congenital abnormalities and high infant mortality in contaminated areas. According to the Chernobyl Forum report, published statistical studies do not provide convincing evidence of this. An increase in the number of congenital pathologies was found in various regions of Belarus between 1986 and 1994, but it was approximately the same in both polluted and clean areas. An unusually high number of cases of Down syndrome were reported in January 1987, but there was no subsequent upward trend in incidence.
Infant mortality is very high in all three countries affected by the Chernobyl accident. After 1986, mortality rates decreased in both polluted and clean areas. Although the decline was slower on average in contaminated areas, the variability observed between years and areas does not allow for a clear trend. In addition, in some of the contaminated areas, infant mortality before the accident was significantly below average. In some of the most heavily contaminated areas, an increase in mortality was noted. It is unclear whether this is due to radiation or other reasons, such as the low standard of living in these areas or the poor quality of medical care. Additional research is being conducted in Belarus, Russia and Ukraine, the results of which were not yet known at the time of publication of the Chernobyl Forum report.
Other diseases
A number of studies have shown that liquidators and residents of contaminated areas are at increased risk of various diseases, such as cataracts, cardiovascular diseases, and decreased immunity. Experts at the Chernobyl Forum came to the conclusion that the connection between cataract diseases and radiation exposure after the accident has been established quite reliably. For other diseases, additional research is required, carefully assessing the influence of competing factors. In addition, residents of the now contaminated areas, people born there, developed mental illnesses due to the evacuation.
The further fate of the station
After the accident at the 4th power unit, the operation of the power plant was suspended due to the dangerous radiation situation. However, already in October 1986, after extensive work to decontaminate the area and build a “sarcophagus”, the 1st and 2nd power units were put back into operation; in December 1987, the work of the 3rd was resumed. In 1991, a fire broke out at the 2nd power unit, and in October of the same year the reactor was completely decommissioned. In December 1995, a memorandum of understanding was signed between the Government of Ukraine and the governments of the G7 countries and the European Union Commission, according to which the development of a program for the complete closure of the station by the year 2000 began. On December 15, 2000, the reactor of the last, 3rd power unit was shut down forever.
The sarcophagus erected over the fourth, exploded power unit is gradually being destroyed. The danger if it collapses is mainly determined by how much radioactive material is inside it. According to official data, this figure reaches 95% of the amount that was at the time of the accident. If this estimate is correct, then the destruction of the shelter could lead to very large releases. In March 2004, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development announced a tender for the design, construction and commissioning of a new sarcophagus for the Chernobyl nuclear power plant. NOVARKA was recognized as the winner of the tender in August 2007
, a joint venture between the French companies
Vinci Construction Grands Projets and BOUYGUES
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Source of information:
Wikipedia
Links:
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Safety Series No.
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INSAG
-7. IAEA, Vienna, 1993;
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